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I.

Introduction and Summary of Conclusions*

A. Issue
This memorandum explores whether customary international law supports the
assignment to a present commander of criminal responsibility for failure to punish his
subordinates when he knows they have committed war crimes under a predecessor commander.
The first part of the memorandum examines the historical development of the doctrine of
command responsibility, focussing on the problem of command culpability and defining the
elements its proof requires. The second part of the memorandum considers the historical
fluctuations in standards applied in the punishment of command culpability, mainly over the
course of the twentieth century. The third part of the memorandum surveys various relevant
conventions and protocols, judgments, and scholarly commentary for references which may
illuminate the issue of temporal application. Particular attention is paid to recently increasing
suggestions that broader temporal application better serves the underlying purpose of the doctrine.
B. Summary of Conclusions
(1) Proving command culpability requires the establishment of the
commander’s effective authority, knowledge, and failure to act.
When these elements must exist has seldom been clearly addressed.
The concept of command responsibility is found in writings about the conduct of
warfare from the earliest to the most recent times.1 The broad concept comprises both the

•

•

Issue: In view of the ICTY/ICTR Appeals Chamber’s July 2003 “Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging
Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility” in Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, Alagic, and Kubura, is
there support in customary international law (or alternatively in conventions, general principles of law, judicial
decisions and writings of eminent commentators) for the proposition that a military commander is criminally
responsible for failing to punish subordinates for crimes which he knows they committed under a predecessor
commander?

1

Major William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV.1, 2-20 (1973). [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 31.]

1

commander’s responsibility to ensure that his troops perform their tasks effectively and his
responsibility to ensure observation of the laws of war. The latter responsibility has both direct
and indirect facets: directly, the commander must not order his troops to perform acts which
would violate the laws of war; but the indirect facet requires that he also must not tolerate or
acquiesce in any violations his troops may commit, by failing to prevent or halt such violations
where he can, or to punish them if he learns of the violations too late to prevent or halt them. This
memorandum is concerned with the last-described responsibility—that is, with the principle that a
commander who fails to prevent, halt, or punish law-of-war violations by his troops becomes
personally liable for those violations—a principle sometimes referred to as command culpability.
In twentieth-century tribunals it has become established that three elements must be proven to
assign command culpability: a) the existence of an effective superior/subordinate relationship; b)
knowledge by the superior of the subordinate’s violation of the law of war; and c) failure by the
superior to prevent, halt, or punish the violation. Definitions and temporal applications of these
elements have not been clearly settled, but the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) recognizes
that a superior may incur criminal responsibility for a crime committed by one of his
subordinates if two criteria are met. First, the superior must have known or had reason to
know that his subordinate was about to commit or had committed a crime. … Second, the
superior must have failed: (1) to take the necessary and reasonable measures available at
the time to prevent the subordinate from committing, the crime, (2) to stop the
subordinate engaged in criminal activity, or (3) to punish the subordinate for the crime
and thus deter other criminal activity.2
(2) Twentieth-century trials applied varying standards in the enforcement
of the elements of command culpability. Standards are still in flux, with
attention to case-by-case facts being an important determinant of outcomes.

2

VIRGINIA MORRIS AND MICHAEL P. SCHARF, 1 AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, 100-101. (INSIDER’S GUIDE) [Relevant
excerpts reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9]

2

Beginning with some nineteenth-century cases, but especially since World War I,
attempts have been made to articulate and codify standards for command culpability. Standards
have varied from virtually strict liability, where de jure authority without more appears to have
been dispositive, to a very strict actual knowledge standard, where even the commander’s
presence at the scene of violations did not suffice to establish responsibility.3 Variations remain
among recently negotiated codifications of the principle.4 The task of the International Tribunals
in applying command responsibility doctrine is complex:
The action required depends on when the superior knew or should have known
about the crime. A person who has the authority and the opportunity to prevent a
crime and fails to do so is to some extent responsible for the fact that the crime
occurred. Similarly, a person who learns that a subordinate has committed a
crime and fails to take measures to punish the perpetrator is not only condoning
the crime committed but also sending a signal that such crimes can be committed
with impunity, thereby encouraging rather than deterring the commission of
additional crimes in the future. In such circumstances, the superior’s failure to act
may be viewed as contributing to the commission of the crime or as implicating
the superior in the crime by conferring impunity on the perpetrator. It will be for
the International Tribunal to determine the degree of culpability of a superior for a
crime committed by a subordinate in light of the facts and circumstances of the
case and bearing in mind the exceptional nature of this basis for individual
criminal responsibility.5

(3) Statutory analysis, case histories, policy, and scholarly commentary favor
a broad temporal application of the elements of command culpability. This
is particularly important regarding failure to punish—since narrow
temporal application can leave accountability gaps which result in impunity
and encourage further violations.

3

Matthew Lippman, Humanitarian Law: The Uncertain Contours of Command Responsibility, 8.2 TULSA J. COMP.
& INTL. L. 1, 91-92 (2001). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 28.]
4

The Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR have the same language on this issue, but their provisions differ from that in
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This difference will be discussed below.
5

1 INSIDER’S GUIDE , supra note 2 at 100-101. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]
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Most codifications of command culpability include language which encompasses not
only present and future, but also past violations in the scope of a commander’s responsibility for
supervising his troops.6 Case histories have not explicitly addressed time frame, but analysis of
the relation between fact patterns and judgments reveals that broad applications have been put
into effect. Such broad application is consistent with the underlying policy goal of command
culpability, which is to protect civilian populations from atrocities committed by military
personnel. Scholarly commentary has pointed out this consistency, and the importance of
maintaining international standards on this issue in times when the criminal results of so many
military conflicts are being brought to internationally-operated tribunals.
II.

Background

This section will frame the issue in contemporary terms, and then survey the historical
development of the elements and standards of command responsibility doctrine. It will lay the
foundation for the later assertion that contemporary command responsibility doctrine should
clarify a broad temporal application of the responsibility to punish as a logical projection from
historical precedents.
A. Factual Background
The issue explored in this memo arises from a case before the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. In an amended indictment against Amir Kubura, the
Prosecutor charges Kubura with being “criminally responsible in relation to … crimes that were
committed by troops of the AbiH 3rd Corps 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade prior to his assignment

6

Typical is the ICTY/ICTR wording, which holds commanders responsible if they were involved in “planning,
preparation or execution” of a crime, or if they “knew or had reason to know that [a] subordinate was about to
commit such acts or had done so…. “ Statute of the ICTY, Article 7; Statute of the ICTR, Article 6. [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 5 and 6]

4

[as substitute Commander] on 1 April 1993.”7 Since Kubura became Chief of Staff in the Brigade
in question on 1 January 19938, the prosecution argued that “Amir Kubura knew or had reason to
know about these crimes. After he assumed command, he was under the duty to punish the
perpetrators.”9
Counsel for the defendants filed a motion challenging the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in the
case on several grounds, including the nature of the conflict (internal or international) in which
the alleged offenses occurred, and the temporal application of command responsibility doctrine.
The Trial Chamber held that customary international law does apply command responsibility
doctrine in both internal and international armed conflicts, and that “in principle a commander can
be liable under the doctrine of command responsibility for crimes committed prior to the moment
that the commander assumed command.”10 In the appeal of that decision, the Appeals Chamber
unanimously dismissed the appeal insofar as it related to the internal nature of the conflict. But
the Appeals Chamber by a 3-2 majority allowed the appeal as it challenged the application of
command responsibility doctrine to the duty to punish perpetrators of crimes committed before
the superior/subordinate relationship existed.11

7

Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, Alagic, and Kubura, Caae IT-01-47-AR72 (Hadzihasanovic et al.), Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 15. (Decision on Appeal)(16
July 2003). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 16.]

8

Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic et al, IT-01-47 (ICTY 2002-2003) Indictment, 8. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 16.]
9

Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic et al.,IT-01-47 (ICTY 2002-2003)Amended Indictment, para. 58. Quoted in
Decision on Appeal at 15. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 16.]

10

Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic et al.,IT-01-47 (ICTY 2002-2003) Decision pursuant to Rule 72(E) as to Validity
of Appeal (21 February 2003). Quoted in Decision on Appeal at 3. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 16.]

11

Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic et al.,IT-01-47 (ICTY 2002-2003), Decision on Appeal at 15-25. [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 16.]
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This memorandum joins the dissenting Appeals Chamber judges in arguing that although
previous judicial holdings do not establish clear precedent, the historical development of
command responsibility doctrine along with the language of international instruments and the
writings of eminent commentators supports the Trial Chamber’s view that command
responsibility doctrine should encompass a duty to punish known violations committed under a
predecessor commander.
B. Historical Background
As far back as military organizations have operated, or at least as far back as their
operations have been analyzed in writing, a commander’s influence over his troops has been
recognized. In the oldest known military treatise, dating to 500 B. C. E., Sun Tzu wrote, “When
troops flee, are insubordinate, distressed, collapse in disorder, or are routed, it is the fault of the
general.”12 Sun Tzu’s attention was focused on the importance of effective command to the
success of the military mission—the first and most obvious prong of command responsibility.
But in a demonstration of his theory, when officers failed to discipline their troops Sun Tzu
declared them at fault and had them beheaded--after which the troops performed faultlessly under
newly appointed officers.13 Thus even this earliest example sets a precedent of officers’ being
punished for their failure to punish their subordinates.
Superiors’ criminal responsibility for crimes committed by subordinates has also been
recognized from very early times. In 1439 Charles VII of France issued an Ordinance at Orleans
which set out a strong policy of command responsibility including a clear duty to punish:

12

S. TZU, THE ART OF WAR 125 (S. Griffith transl. 1963). Quoted in Parks, supra note 1, at 3. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 31.]
13

Id. at 4.

6

The King orders that each captain or lieutenant be held responsible for the abuses,
ills and offences committed by members of his company, and that as soon as he
receives any complaint concerning any such misdeed or abuse, he bring the
offender to justice so that the said offender be punished in a manner
commensurate with his offence, according to these ordinances. If he fails to do so
or covers up the misdeed or delays taking action, or if, because of his negligence
or otherwise, the offender escapes and thus evades punishment, the captain shall
be deemed responsible for the offence as if he had committed it himself and shall
be punished in the same way as the offender would have been.14
Evidence that this approach to command responsibility was not only announced but also
followed in the fifteenth century comes from the case of Peter von Hagenbach, who in 1474 was
tried by an international tribunal of twenty-eight judges from allied states of the Holy Roman
Empire on charges of failing to prevent his subordinates from committing murder, rape, perjury,
and other crimes against “the laws of God and man.” Hagenbach was held to have had a duty to
prevent such crimes; convicted of failing to do so, he was deprived of his knighthood and
executed.15
In the seventeenth century, Grotius declared that “a community, or its rulers, may be
held responsible for the crime of a subject if they knew it and do not prevent it when they could
and should prevent it.”16 Grotius thus places the responsibility for preventing violations of law
on “a community, or its rulers,” and this general responsibility of rulers is also carried forward
into contemporary international law. But the more specific duty to punish law-of-war violations
after they have occurred continues to be assigned to military commanders. Another early

14

L.C. Green, Command Responsibility in International Law, 5 TRANSNAT’L. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 319, 321.
(citation omitted) . [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 25.]
15

Waldemar A. Solf, A Response to Telford Taylor’s Nuremberg and Vietnam: an American Tragedy, 5 AKRON L.
REV. 43, 65 (1972). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 35.];and Jordan Paust, My Lai and Vietnam:
Norms, Myths, and Leader Responsibility, 57 MIL. L. REV. 99, 112 (1972). Quoted in Parks, supra note 1, at 4-5.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31.]
16

II GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS 523 (C. E. I. P. ed, Kelsy transl., 1925) Quoted in Parks, supra note 1, at 4.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31.]
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codification of this principle of indirect command responsibility (duty not only to avoid giving
illegal orders, but also to punish unordered violations) appears in the 1775 Massachusetts
Articles of War, where the eleventh article states:
Every Officer commanding, in quarters, or on a march, shall keep good
order, and to the utmost of his power, redress all such abuses or disorders
which may be committed by any Officer or Soldier under his command; if
upon complaint made to him of Officers or Soldiers beating or otherwise
ill-treating any person, or committing any kind of riots to the disquieting
of the inhabitants of the Continent, he, the said commander, who shall
refuse or omit to see Justice done to this offender or offenders, and
reparation made to the party or parties injured, as soon as the offender’s
wages shall enable him or them, upon due proof thereof, be punished, as
ordered by General Court-Martial, in such manner as if he himself had
committed the crimes or disorders complained of.17
Thus, by the end of the eighteenth century a firm foundation was established for the
responsibility of a military commander not only to refrain from issuing illegal orders, but to “see
Justice done” with regard to any illegal acts by his subordinates of which he became aware; and
the penalty for refusal or omission to perform this duty was to be punishment “as if he himself
had committed the crimes … .” Acceptance of this responsibility is part of the commander’s
duty, and his failure to halt, prevent, or punish violations is treated both as a breach of duty and
as acquiescence in the crimes.
C.

Development of Elements of Command Culpability
By the late nineteenth century, WilliamWinthrop had undertaken an authoritative

commentary on Military Law and Precedents in which he emphasized that, both under the
American Articles of War and the general obligations of the laws of war, “[t]he observance of
the rule protecting from violence the unarmed population is especially to be enforced by

17

Articles of War, Provisional Congress of Massachusetts Bay, April 5, 1775. Quoted in Parks, supra note 1, at 5.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31.]
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commanders in occupying or passing through towns or villages of the enemy’s country.”18
Winthrop wrote in the aftermath of the American Civil War. The Civil War’s Lieber Code,
which dealt extensively with the conduct of military forces in the field, did not specifically treat
the subject of failure to prevent or punish illegal conduct by subordinates.19 Article 71 of the
Lieber Code did, however, provide the death penalty for anyone who intentionally mistreated a
wounded enemy, however, or for “whoever … orders or encourages soldiers to do so.”20 Also,
the Union government did try enemy commanders for crimes of omission which occurred during
the war. For example, Captain Henry Wirz was held responsible apparently not only for his own
“direct acts of cruelty and murder” but also for failure to alleviate inhuman conditions at the
Andersonville, Georgia prison camp where he was in charge.21 Although Wirz protested that he
had tried unsuccessfully to improve the food, shelter, and health care conditions at the prison
(and there was some evidence that he had made efforts to do so), the court held him to a strict
liability standard; he was determined to have presided over a camp whose conditions
contravened the international law of war, and was executed.22 The strict liability standard is,
obviously, the harshest available, and it has been questioned whether the Wirz conviction was

18

WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 779 (2nd ed. 1920). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 12.]

19

Stuart E. Hendin, Command Responsibility and Superior Orders in the Twentieth Century—A Century of
Evolution, 10 MURDOCH UNIVERSITY ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF LAW 4, para. 10 (March 2003), found at
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v10n1/hendin101_text.html. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 26.]
20

Instructins for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100 (1863) (the
Lieber Code), Article 71. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]

21

Lippman, supra note 3, at 2. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 28.]

22

The Trial of Captain Henry Wirz for Conspiracy and Murder, Washington D. C. , 1865, in VII AMERICAN STATE
TRIALS 657 (John D. Lawson ed. 1917). Quoted in Lippman, supra note 3 at 2-3. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 28.]

9

more “victor’s justice” than international humanitarian justice.23 For purposes of tracing the
development of indirect command responsibility, however, the Wirz case is only partially
relevant. Wirz was held responsible for acts of omission rather than commission; but he was not
specifically assigned imputed responsibility for acts of subordinates whose behavior he should
have controlled.
Slightly later in time the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land, in “the first modern attempt to codify what could be described as the laws of
war,” established a “basic skeleton of international humanitarian law.” Article 3 of this
Convention provided that “if there was a violation of the articles or regulations that the
belligerent State so violating them would be responsible for the acts committed by its military
and would be liable to pay compensation for the same.”24 Like the seventeenth-century assertion
by Grotius,25 this provision allocated command culpability to the belligerent state rather than to
individual commanders, but because of its formalization in a multilateral Convention it was a
step toward an international standard for allocation of responsibility to redress violations of the
laws of war.
The next very large step toward establishing the parameters of international command
responsibility enforcement was made by the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of
the War and on Enforcement of Penalties appointed by the Preliminary Peace Conference at the
close of World War I.26 This Commission proposed that “individuals responsible for …

23

Lippman, supra note 3, at 4. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 28.]

24

Hendin, supra note 19 at para. 13.[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 26.]

25

GROTIUS, supra note 7.

26

Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War an on Enforcement of Penalties (March 29, 1919), 14
AM. J. INT’L. L.. 95 (1920) (Commission on the Responsibility). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
22.]

10

atrocities should be subject to criminal prosecution, regardless of rank or status.”27 It also
specified that individuals would be held responsible both for affirmative acts and for failure to
intervene; diplomatic immunity for the highest-ranking officials was disapproved, and the
acceptability of a defense of superior orders was left for the relevant court to determine.28 At this
point, the necessary elements of command culpability became fairly clearly formulated; although
the Commission’s initial formulation posited that authorities should be liable for a failure to act,
“regardless of their degree of knowledge or capacity to prevent the commission of crimes,” the
American representatives objected to this provision;29 it was ultimately held that “a conviction
under command responsibility required that the accused had possessed the position, power,
capacity and knowledge to halt the crimes.”30 This can be seen as an early formulation of the
contemporary three-prong doctrine, comprising the superior/subordinate relationship; the
knowledge (at some level) of the violations; and the ability to halt, prevent, or punish the
violations. As noted earlier, the temporal application of each element is not explicitly addressed.
The Commission’s recommendation of criminal prosecution was intended to result in
international trials of individuals whose criminal acts affected the interests of more than one of
the Allied and Associated Powers.31 A roster of 3,000 such individuals was gradually reduced
until finally forty-five individuals were prosecuted. One of those was Emil Muller, a captain in
the German army reserves who was briefly in charge of a prison camp in France which housed

27

Id. at 116.

28

Id.

29

Memorandum of Reservations Presented by the Representatives of the United States to the Report of the
Commission on Responsibilities, annex II, in Commission on the Responsibility, supra note 26, at 127, 143.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22.]

30

Lippman, supra note 3, at 9. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 28.]
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English Prisoners of War.32 Muller was acquitted of willful neglect of the abominable provisions
and sanitary conditions at the prison camp he commanded, because it was found that he had
made improvements, and the remaining problems were due to “circumstances which were
beyond him and also his immediate superiors.”33 However, Muller was convicted of ill treatment
of prisoners and subordinates, on evidence that he “witnessed a prisoner being harshly
reprimanded by a Sergeant-Major, made an unrecorded remark, and the soldier then proceeded to
fell the prisoner with his fist.” Regarding this episode, the German Supreme Court concluded
that Muller was responsible because he “at least tolerated and approved of this brutal treatment,
even if it was not done on his orders.” This situation was distinguished from other mistreatment
of prisoners, which was determined to have been “carried out on the initiative of noncommissioned officers without Muller’s knowledge,” for which cases Muller was not held
responsible.34 The German Court’s imputation of responsibility on the basis of Muller’s
tolerance and approval of brutality supplies ongoing support for the assignment of responsibility
for failure to punish.
The Muller case thus illustrates that by the end of World War I the elements of command
culpability had become settled: the accused must be in a position to prevent or punish the war
law violation (i.e., a superior/subordinate relationship must exist); the accused must know about
the violation; and the accused must have the capacity to take effective action (i.e., he must be
31
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able to prevent, halt, or punish the offense). In the following decades, however, discussion and
variation continued on the standards by which each element would be judged.

D.

Fluctuation of Command Culpability Standards in the Twentieth Century
(1) Post-World War II Trials

The most-discussed single case among the post-World War II command responsibility
trials is that of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, who served as commanding general of the
Fourteenth Army Group of the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands from October 9,
1944, until his surrender on September 3, 1945.35 Yamashita took command of Japanese forces
in the Philippines only a few days before the beginning of the American invasion of the
Philippines.36 During his command, the American attack was under way and Japanese forces
were largely in retreat. After his surrender in September 1945, he was charged (on October 2,
1945) with having “unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as commander to
control the operations of the members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal
atrocities….”37 The charge included 123 atrocities, involving the execution, torture, starving,
and other mistreatment of thousands of civilians and prisoners of war. A great deal of evidence
was presented regarding the commission of the atrocities38, but no unrefuted testimony directly
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linked Yamashita to the ordering or commission of the crimes.39 Although Yamashita’s defense
argued that Yamashita himself “knew nothing of any of the atrocities” due to the “complete
breakdown of communications incident to the swift and overpowering advance of the American
forces,” and that “his troops were disorganized and out of control, leaving the inference that he
could not have prevented the atrocities even had he known of them,”40 Yamashita was convicted
and sentenced to death. The theater staff judge who reviewed his case found that

[f]rom the widespread character of the atrocities … the orderliness of their
execution and the proof that they were done pursuant to orders, the conclusion is
inevitable that the accused know about them and either gave his tacit approval to
them or at least failed to do anything either to prevent them or to punish their
perpetrators.41

The Yamashita case has been widely taken to stand for a “strict liability” standard for the
knowledge and capacity elements of the command culpability test. Whether or not it is an
accurate interpretation of the decision, this view of Yamashita illustrates the standard which
represents one end of the command culpability continuum: that which holds a commander
responsible for violations by his subordinates by virtue of his position, regardless of his own
instructions to his troops, his knowledge of their actions, or his practical ability to control their
behavior. The case against Yamashita relied substantially on circumstantial evidence that
atrocities were so widespread and systematic that he “must have known” of them, and probably
ordered them.
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Few (if any) command responsibility cases have been decided on the strict liability
standard.42 Defense attorneys and commentators who believe that more weight should be put on
due process rights of the accused commanders see arguably unjust convictions such as that of
Yamashita as the danger that lurks in broad applications of command responsibility standards.
This view is represented by the dissenting opinions in the U.S. Supreme Court’s case In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, in which the majority held that the military commission which tried and
convicted Yamashita did have Constitutional jurisdiction over him. Justice Murphy in dissent
argued that “the charge against the petitioner [failed to state] a recognized violation of the laws
of war”43 because it held Yamashita to an unreasonable standard of control under harsh battle
conditions.44 Murphy therefore felt that Yamashita’s Fifth Amendment due process rights were
“trampled under by … hatred.”45 In another dissenting opinion, Justice Rutledge protested that
Yamashita was convicted of a “crime … defined after his conduct, alleged to be criminal, [had]
taken place.”46 However, the majority introduced its holding with the observation that
It is evident that the conduct of military operations by troops whose excesses are
unrestrained by the orders or efforts of their commander would almost certainly
result in violations which it is the purpose of the law of war to prevent. Its
purpose to protect civilian populations and prisoners of war from brutality would
largely be defeated if the commander of an invading army could with impunity
neglect to take reasonable measures for their protection. Hence the law of war
presupposes that its violation is to be avoided through the control of the
operations of war by commanders who are to some extent responsible for their
subordinates.47
42
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The Supreme Court majority thus affirms the military commission’s finding that “where murder
and rape and vicious, revengeful actions are widespread offenses, and there is no effective
attempt by a commander to discover and control the criminal acts, such a commander may be
held responsible, even criminally liable, for the lawless acts of his troops ….”48

Emphasizing this view, General MacArthur in his comment in review of the Yamashita
judgment saw its message as essential to the proper function of “the profession of arms” in
society:
Rarely has so cruel and wanton a record been spread to public gaze. Revolting as
this may be in itself, it pales before the sinister and far reaching implication
thereby attached to the profession of arms. The soldier, be he friend or foe, is
charged with the protection of the weak and unarmed. It is the very essence and
reason for his being. When he violates this sacred trust he not only profanes his
entire cult but threatens the very fabric of international society.49
Other post-World War II trials took different approaches to the elements of command
culpability. In 1946, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East was established in Tokyo.
This tribunal in defining command responsibility said that
If this accused knew, or should by the exercise of ordinary diligence have learned,
of the commission by his subordinates … of the atrocities … or of the existence
of routine which would countenance such, and, by his failure to take any action to
punish the perpetrators, permitted the atrocities to continue, he has failed in his
performance of his duty as a commander, and must be punished.50

This standard, though arguably requiring somewhat more proof than the Yamashita “must have
known” standard, supported the conviction of Sunroko Hata, commander of the expeditionary
48
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forces in China. In that case the judges found that large-scale atrocities had been committed by
Hata’s troops and he had either been “indifferent” to them or had “made no provision for
learning” whether laws of war were being enforced. Therefore, Hata’s failure to take steps to
prevent violations was the basis for his conviction.
In later Nuremberg trials, some variation in the knowledge standard has been observed.
The High Command Case, held by the United States occupying authority under Control Council
Law No. 10 in 1948, tried senior German officers who were charged with command responsibility
for law-of-war violations committed by their subordinates.51 Perhaps in deliberate contrast to the
Yamashita decision, the justices in the High Command Case set a difficult standard for imputing
command responsibility:
…it is not considered under the situation outlined that criminal responsibility
attaches to [the commander] merely on the theory of subordination and over-all
command. He must be shown both to have had knowledge and to have been
connected with such criminal acts, either by way of participation or criminal
acquiescence.52
In 1948 another Control Council Law No.10 Tribunal court, in the Hostage Case, moderated the
High Command Case standard slightly, requiring “proof of a causative, overt act or omission
from which a guilty intent can be inferred before a verdict of guilty will be pronounced.”53
(Emphasis supplied.) To be held responsible, the Hostage Case court said an officer “must be
one who orders, abets, or takes a consenting part in the crime.”54 However, a commanding officer
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having received reports of acts in violation of the laws of war could be convicted if he “ignored
reports of such violations and, if having the power to stop them, permitted them to continue.”
Thus, to have ignored reports of violations and left them unpunished was taken as evidence of “a
consenting part in the crime,” which imputed responsibility to the commander.
Richard Lael, in his analysis of command responsibility developments following
Yamashita, points out that the High Command justices increased the burden on the prosecution to
demonstrate “a commanding officer’s knowledge of, and his criminal acquiescence in, a violation
of a law of war.”55 Consistent with this, the High Command justices declined to find the accused
guilty on some counts where proof was inadequate. Importantly, however, where an officer was
found to have knowledge of violations and to have failed to punish them, the justices did interpret
the failure to punish as “amounting to acquiescence.” In the Judgment against Field Marshall von
Kuechler, they held that “[t]here is no evidence tending to show any corrective action on his part.
It appears … therefore that he not only tolerated but approved” of the violations. Von Kuechler
was found guilty on this basis.56 This articulation will be significant in the discussion below of a
commander’s failure to punish known acts committed under a predecessor.
(2) Vietnam—the Medina case
After the post-World War II tribunals, the next notorious command responsibility trials
concerned the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam conflict. Notable for its revision of the
standard of command responsibility was the trial of Captain Ernest Medina, the officer in
command of the infantry company involved. In instructing the jury panel for that case, the judge
specified that “legal requirements placed upon a commander require actual knowledge plus a
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wrongful failure to act. Thus mere presence at the scene will not suffice.”57 Critics of this very
high knowledge standard for command responsibility, including Telford Taylor of the Nuremberg
tribunals, suggested that “the Court’s failure to follow … a variant of the negligence standard
suggests that the instructions were intended to insure that Medina was exonerated.”58 Richard
Lael, on the other hand, noted that Judge Howard’s interpretation “represented a logical
progression from the Yamashita to the Hostage to the High Command cases. … Howard simply
scrapped [the “should have known” standard] altogether.”59 Lael discusses the increased
protection this approach affords for military commanders under “atrocity-producing stress,”60 and
analyzes the relation of Judge Howard’s instructions to earlier and later command responsibility
standards.
(3) Late-twentieth century protocols and statutes
The 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International armed Conflicts (Protocol I) contains two
Articles which attempt once again to codify the international standard of command responsibility.
Professor Ilias Bantekas, in surveying contemporary command responsibility law, points out that
post-World War II prosecutions for criminal omissions were mainly based on national laws which
allowed the prosecution of “those superiors who tolerated the crimes of their subordinates,”since
the Tribunal charters did not contain such provisions. However, Bantekas notes,
[t]he same obligations were later contained in Article 87 of Geneva Protocol I
(1977). Not only were these command duties uncontested during the
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deliberations for the adoption of Geneva Protocol I, but both Articles 86 and 87
were held to be in conformity with pre-existing law.61
With regard to the knowledge requirement, Lael opines that Articles 86 and 87 of Protocol I have
“completed the erosion of the Yamashita precedent” by moving definitively from the “should
have known” standard there applied to a more restrictive knowledge standard.62 Article 86
attributes responsibility to the High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict “if they
knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the
time” that violations were committed, and failed to act.63 Lippman, however, views Protocol I as
a compromise, “sufficiently elastic to incorporate both a specific intent and a gross negligence
standard.”64 He further observes that “[t]he ‘should have enabled them to conclude’ standard
while less harsh than strict liability also insures that officials cannot adopt a disengaged and
disinterested demeanor.”65
When the Statutes for the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda were established, they included provisions which reflect the elasticity noted by Lippman
as being characteristic of Protocol I. The command responsibility provisions in Article 7 of the
ICTY statute and Article 6 of the ICTR statute reflect the principles of Protocol I. The drafters of
Protocol I intended to codify the practice of the post-World War II tribunals imputing
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responsibility where a commander “had not intervened to prevent a breach or put a stop to it.”66
Consistent with this, the Commission of Experts drafting the ICTY statute adopted the “knew, or
had information which should have enabled them to conclude” standard of Protocol I.67
A still later formulation of command responsibility doctrine appears in the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which was initialed in 1998 and came into force in July
2002. Command responsibility is addressed in Article 28 of the Rome Statute; again the
knowledge standard has been modified. Although the Article 28 (a)(1) standard for military
commanders and persons acting effectively as such maintains the “knew or had reason to know”
standard, the nearby Article 28(b)(1), which applies to civilian superior/subordinate relationships,
attaches liability to superiors only if “the superior either knew, or consciously disregarded
information which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to commit
such crimes.” This creates a lower standard for civilian superiors than for military ones, which is
a matter of concern for some commentators.68 In contrast, the ICC standard for military leaders,
as Professor Lippman points out, does not allow for a “disengaged and disinterested demeanor.”69
The historical record reveals, then, repeated efforts to establish standards for command
responsibility. If the earliest cases are included in the consideration, it can be seen that standards
which have been applied vary considerably with regard to all three elements (position of control,
knowledge of violations, and practical ability to act). Extensive attention and variation appear
66
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particularly on the knowledge element. Little explicit attention has been given to the temporal
application of command responsibility, in spite of the facts that it is a relevant consideration in all
three elements and that variation in time-specific wording of statutes can significantly affect
judicial determination of culpability. A re-examination of relevant precedents and current
scholarly commentary will suggest that a broad temporal application of command responsibility,
at least in military contexts, best serves the underlying purpose of the doctrine—the protection of
civilian populations—and is a logical result of the doctrine’s historical development.
III

Evidence of Practice and Principle Regarding Temporal Application of
Indirect Command Responsibility

In evaluating direct command responsibility (where the superior has actually given the
order for a violation of the laws of war), temporal application requires no discussion—a command
cannot be carried out before it is given. However, in the context of indirect command culpability,
where the commander’s responsibility is to intervene and prevent, halt, or punish violations of
which he is aware, the temporal application becomes important in each of the crime’s three
elements. At what time must the superior-subordinate relationship exist relative to the violation?
At what time must knowledge (or the reasonable expectation of knowledge) come to the superior?
At what time must the superior possess the practical ability to halt or punish (the timing of
prevention being obvious) the violation(s)? This memorandum will restrict its discussion to the
responsibility to punish, since that presents the widest range of time variation.70
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This memorandum suggests that if a superior has both knowledge and the practical ability
to punish violations committed by a subordinate within his command, the fact that the violations
may have been committed under a predecessor superior should not excuse the present superior
from his responsibility to punish. The rationale for this position is three-pronged: (a) it best
serves the underlying purpose of command responsibility doctrine, which is the protection of the
civilian population from abuses which wartime conditions tend to promote; (b) it does not deprive
commanders of due process rights, since as military officers they accept the responsibility to
prevent abuses, and failure to punish amounts to acquiescence in violations, whether past or
present; and (c) knowledge that abuses have been punished acts as a general deterrent to future
abuses, while failure to punish perpetuates the environment of lawlessness which fosters further
violations. This analysis is supported by dicta and judgments from historical cases as well as by
analysis of wordings in statutes and conventions, and particularly by scholarly commentary.
A. Evidence from historical cases
In an extensive study of command responsibility doctrine, Matthew Lippman points out
that “[c]ommand culpability is designed to encourage military commanders and civilian superiors
to fulfill their legal duty to control the conduct of combatants.”71 The necessity for such control
may seem obvious, but was well articulated by President Theodore Roosevelt in confirming the
1902 conviction of Brigadier-General Jacob Smith for command culpability during the Samur
campaign in the Philippines:
…the very fact that warfare is of such a character as to afford infinite provocation
for the commission of acts of cruelty by junior officers and enlisted men, must
make the officers in high and responsible positions peculiarly careful in their
bearing and conduct so as to keep a moral check over the acts of an improper
character by their subordinates.72
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A.P.V. Rogers of the International Committee for the Red Cross points out that failure to
punish has a tendency to create “a climate of disregard for the law of war.”73 Rogers points to the
Nuremberg conviction of Major Rauer, “presumably on the basis that … he created a climate in
which it was known by his subordinates that they would not be punished for killing prisoners of
war.”74 In the Nuremberg Control Council Law No.10 Einsatzgruppen Case, Brigadier General
Erich Naumann offered as part of his defense the assertion that “when he assumed command of
his unit the orders in question were already in effect.”75 The Tribunal rejected this defense,
however, holding that it was incumbent upon the defendant to have rejected the orders or at least
demonstrated that he was not in agreement with them.76
In the Hostage and High Command cases, also under Control Council Law No. 10 at
Nuremberg, “[a]bsence from headquarters was not a defense in those instances in which a military
official instituted or acquiesced in a policy.”77 This holding supports a broad temporal application
of command responsibility, requiring the commander to take corrective action even though he
was not in effective command (being absent) at the time of violations, and treating his failure to
do so as acquiescence in the violations. A more particular relevance of temporal application has
also been noted in the High Command Case. In that case, counts two and three of the
indictments against Field Marshalls von Leeb and von Kuechler charge them with responsibility
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for the killings of hundreds of noncombatants in areas which were under the command of von
Leeb during part of the relevant time and “thereafter of von Kuechler.” The tribunal acquitted
von Leeb on count two, finding that as a matter of fact he had never been made aware of the
illegal actions under the order in question; von Kuechler, however, was convicted on counts two
and three of the indictment, the tribunal holding that since “[m]any reports were made” about the
execution of the orders in question, “[i]t was his business to know” of the activities of his
subordinates which were duly reported.78 This combination of facts supports the inference that
“von Kuechler was held liable for failing to punish the crimes that had been committed under a
predecessor superior and of which he was aware.”79 In general, the High Command Tribunal
“was very clear in its principle that once the territorial commander had knowledge of criminal
conduct on the part of a subordinate, even if that subordinate was outside of his chain of
command, there was a positive duty to intervene.”80
A broad temporal application of command responsibility is also indicated by the case of
Samuel W. Koster, Commander of the 23rd Infantry (Americal) Division which launched the
infamous My Lai operation in 1968. This was not a case of offenses committed under a
predecessor commander, but Koster was charged with failing to respond to information about the
massacre, and “may have initiated a conspiracy to conceal information” concerning the events.81
Charges against Koster were dismissed, but when critics complained that this was “a disservice to
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the rule of international law, the law of war and the United States Constitution,”82the Secretary of
the Army imposed administrative sanctions which were upheld by the United States Court of
Claims with the observation that “there was no area in which a strict standard of command
liability was as necessary as the investigation of misconduct.”83 This assertion highlights the
importance of a commander’s responsibility after the commission of offenses. To prevent or halt
misconduct is of course preferable to discovering and punishing it after the fact. But also
essential to the general effectiveness of the laws of war is maintaining the principle that those
laws cannot be violated, nor can violations be condoned, with impunity.
B. Language of conventions, statutes, and other documents
(1) Protocol I
To examine the language of conventions and statutes which specifically relates to the
temporal application of command responsibility, it is logical to begin with the 1977 Protocol I
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, since the inclusion and wording of the
command responsibility doctrine in that instrument codifies the widespread acceptance of its
elements between 1949 and 1977.84 In this Protocol, Article 86 treats generally breaches of
international law arising from omissions. It contains two clauses. Clause 1 provides that
The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall repress grave
breaches and shall take measures necessary to suppress all other breaches, of the
Convention or of the Protocol which result from a failure to act when under a duty
to do so.85
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This article applies, then, to the top level of superiors in each Party—Prime Ministers and
other political leaders, rather than military commanders. While important, this is not the focus of
this memorandum; however, analysis of this article sheds light by contrast on the language of
Article 87, which does apply specifically to military commanders. The second clause of Article
86 clarifies somewhat the degree of responsibility of the political leaders:
The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a
subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary
responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had information which should
have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he was
committing or was about to commit such a breach and if they did not take all
feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.
Political leaders, then are required to “repress” grave breaches, and “suppress” other breaches.
The ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols points out that “[g]rave breaches must be
repressed, which implies the obligation to enact legislation laying down effective penal sanctions
for perpetrators of such breaches.”86 In contrast, for breaches of the Protocols other than grave
breaches, “the Parties to the Protocol undertake to suppress them, which means that [the initial
responsibility to repress] … does not detract from the right of States under customary law … to
punish serious violations of the laws of war under the principle of universal jurisdiction.”87 The
Commentary points out that this imposition of responsibility incurred by negligence is
potentially problematic in criminal law. It is conceded that “[t]his element in criminal law is far
from being clarified, but it is essential” to the system of penal sanctions of the Conventions, and
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the Conference apparently had faith in the ability of tribunals to succeed in “satisfying the
requirement of justice in … very difficult situations.”88
Article 87 of Protocol I specifically deals with the duty of military commanders. The
Commentary points out that “[the] first duty of a military commander whatever his rank, is to
exercise command”89, and that accordingly, “the role of commanders is decisive” in ensuring
that “a fatal gap between the undertakings entered into by parties to the conflict and the conduct
of individuals is avoided.”90
Article 87 contains three clauses, each of which solidifies some aspect of a commander’s
responsibility. The first clause provides:
The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall require military
commanders, with respect to members of the armed forces under their command
and other persons under their control, to prevent and, where necessary, to
suppress and to report to competent authorities breaches of the Conventions and
of this Protocol.
Thus, the first clause requires the commander to deal affirmatively with breaches which he
perceives in the future (prevent), in the present (suppress), and in the past (report to competent
authorities) behavior of his troops.
The second clause deals with recognition in advance of command responsibility:
In order to prevent and suppress breaches, High Contracting Parties and Parties to
the conflict shall require that, commensurate with their level of responsibility,
Commanders ensure that members of the armed forces under their command are
aware of their obligations under the Conventions and this Protocol.
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This provision essentially addresses due process concerns of commanders, who are to be
made “aware of their obligations” so that prosecution for failure to meet those obligations cannot
be seen as unjust.
The third clause then specifies the commander’s obligations in more detail, and in so
doing clarifies the breadth of temporal application involved.
The High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict shall require any
commander who is aware that subordinates or other persons under his control are
going to commit or have committed a breach of the Conventions or of this
Protocol, to initiate such steps as are necessary to prevent such violations of the
Conventions or this Protocol, and, where appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or
penal actions against violators thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, while “penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be,” is included in the duty to
suppress for political leaders, it is set forth as an explicit and separate duty for the military
commanders. In addition, the difference in verb-tense content between the specifications of
Article 86, which applies to top-level administrators of the Parties, and Article 87, which applies
to military commanders, is crucial to the analysis of temporal application. The top-level
administrators, presumed to be in control throughout the conflict, are charged with responsibility
for breaches which they knew (or should have been able to conclude) their subordinates were
“committing or [were] about to commit” if they do not take “all feasible measures within their
power to prevent or repress” such breaches. In contrast, the military commanders, whose field
assignments may vary more fluidly over the course of a conflict, are to be made aware of “their
obligations” to prevent and punish (“initiate disciplinary or penal actions”) any breaches which
“subordinates or other persons under [their] control are going to commit or have committed.”
(Emphasis supplied.) The Commentary points out that while Paragraph 1 of Article 87 addresses
the prevention and suppression of breaches, Paragraph 3 also includes reference to “the case
where a commander ‘is aware that subordinates or other persons under his control are going to
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commit or have committed a breach.’ Thus these two paragraphs complement each
other.”91(Emphasis supplied) The breadth of temporal application is, therefore, explicitly
intended. Further, the Commentary points out that “[i]n adopting these texts, the drafters of the
Protocol justifiably considered that military commanders … more than anyone else … can
prevent breaches by creating the appropriate frame of mind,” and that in case a breach does
occur, “they are in a position to establish or ensure the establishment of the facts, which would
be the starting point for any action to suppress or punish a breach.”92 Protocol I, therefore,
establishes a firm basis for application of command responsibility to a commander’s failure to
initiate disciplinary or penal measures to redress law-of-war violations committed by his
subordinates under a predecessor commander.
(2) Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR
The Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, promulgated in 1993 and 1994, follow the model of
Protocol I in employing both past and future time frames to specify commanders’ individual
criminal responsibility for failure to punish breaches. ICTY Statute Article 7 and ICTR Statute
Article 6, respectively, provide that:
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal
responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to
commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Given that both formulations were present in the Protocol I model, the fact that the Statutes
include the “or had done so” language strongly suggests that the Statute drafters deliberately
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chose inclusion of the past-tense phrase so as to include the responsibility for acts committed
before the commander in question was on the scene—rather than its exclusion, which might
leave such situations to fall between the cracks. This suggestion is supported by the fact that the
documentary history of the Statute’s adoption includes three draft versions which did not include
the past-tense element.93 In addition, a March 1993 letter from the National Alliance of
Women’s Organizations urges that the Statute “provide for the prosecution … of those who
ordered, encouraged, assisted, condoned or failed to take effective measures to prevent”
atrocities,94and a note verbale from the Netherlands representative on 4 May 1993 suggests that
the following offences in particular should be within the competence of the ad hoc
tribunal:
-The fact of having ordered, authorized or permitted the commission of
war crimes and/or crimes against humanity, and
-The fact of being in a position “to influence the general standard of
behaviour” and having culpably neglected to take action against crimes of
that kind. …95
Thus, when the Statute was adopted at the 3217th meeting of the Security Council on 25 May
1993, Mrs. Albright of the United States could clarify that “[w]ith respect to paragraph 1 of
Article 7, it is our understanding that individual liability arises in the case of … the failure of a
superior … to take reasonable steps to prevent or punish [Article 2 through 5] crimes by persons
under his or her authority.”96 The intention to include duty to punish within the Statute is also
confirmed by the Venezuelan representative’s statement that the adoption of the Statute is part of
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a response by the Security Council to the international community’s awareness that “[n]othing
encourages crime more than impunity….”97
Further interpretive commentary on the ICTY Statute is offered by M. Cherif Bassiouni,
who points out that the Statute does not contain a “general part,” which would ordinarily provide
definitions of the “constitutive elements of the crimes.” Although some such provisions appear
in Article 7 of the Statute (comprising the explanation of command responsibility), “none of
these questions are defined with the minimum specificity required in most criminal justice
systems.”98 The Tribunal must therefore “fill these legal gaps,” relying on the “limited
guidance” offered by customary international law. Once source of such guidance is the
judgments of earlier international tribunals. Another is the reports of the Commission of Experts
who drafted the Statute. Regarding the temporal application of command responsibility, the
Commission of Experts’ interim report includes the following comments:
In particular, a military commander who is assigned command and control over
armed combatant groups who have engaged in war crimes in the past should
refrain from employing such groups in combat, until they clearly demonstrate
their intention and capability to comply with the law in the future…Thus, a
commander has a duty to do everything reasonable and practicable to prevent
violations of the law. Failure to carry out such a duty carries with it
responsibility.
Lastly, a military commander has the duty to punish or discipline those
under his command whom he knows or has reasonable grounds to know
committed a violation.99
3. ICTY judgment, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac
An important discussion of the temporal application of command responsibility by the
ICTY emerges from the judgment in the case of Milorad Krnojelac, who was convicted of
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persecution, inhumane acts, and cruel treatment as a superior as well as of cruel treatment for his
individual responsibility. The court clarified the temporal application with regard to the first
element of command responsibility, the existence of a superior/subordinate relationship. The
Trial Chamber in the Krnojelac case pointed out that the authority of a superior might be either
permanent or temporary or might even be on an ad hoc basis.100 The judgment goes on to
distinguish command responsibility of temporary or ad hoc commanders from permanent ones:
To be held liable for the acts of men who operated under him on an ad hoc or
temporary basis, it must be shown that, at the time when the acts charged in the
indictment were committed, those persons were under the effective control of the
particular individual.101
Since the court points out that ad hoc or temporary commanders do not have responsibility for
their temporary subordinates outside the time frame of their actual effective control, the converse
should be taken as clearly implied; that is, a commander who takes up a “permanent” command
assignment does have responsibility for his long-term subordinates outside the time frame of his
actual effective control. Hence it follows that a commander who takes up a command where he
knows or soon learns that his new subordinates have already committed violations of the laws of
war has an affirmative duty to take appropriate penal or disciplinary action—and that his failure
to do so amounts to acquiescence in the violations, resulting in his own criminal liability.
(4) Various war manuals
In a survey of war manuals of various countries, Major General A.P.V. Rogers cites
segments from Australian, United Kingdom, and United States war manuals which include the
past-tense provision as part of the commander’s responsibility:
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Australia (1996): The commander will be held responsible if the commander:
a)knows subordinates are going to commit war crimes and does not prevent them,
b)knows subordinates have committed war crimes and does not punish them,
c)should know subordinates are going to commit war crimes and does not prevent
them, or
d)should know subordinates have committed war crimes and does not punish
them.102
U.K. (1958): The commander is also responsible, if he has actual knowledge or
should have knowledge, through reports received by him or through other means,
that troops or other persons subject to his control are about to commit or have
committed a war crime and if he fails to use the means at his disposal to ensure
compliance with the law of war.103
U.S.A. (1997): Commanders are responsible for war crimes committed by their
subordinates when any one of three circumstances applies:
a. The commander ordered the commission of the act;
b. The commander knew of the act, either before or during its commission, and
did nothing to prevent or stop it; or when
c. The commander should have known, “through reports received by him or
through other means, that troops or other persons subject to his control [were]
about to commit or [had] committed a war crime and he fail[ed] to take the
necessary and reasonable steps to insure compliance with the law of war or to
punish violators thereof.104
All of these excerpts are significant as evidence of the customary assumption that a commander
is responsible to punish offenses which his subordinates have committed in the past—not only to
prevent or halt ongoing offenses. The U.S. Army Field Manual is most specific in breaking out
the various temporal applications: clause b, regarding prevention or halting of the violation,
acknowledges the necessary limitation of this course of action to the commander who knows of
the violation “before or during” its commission, while clause c introduces the past tense to
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emphasize the necessity of punishing past actions when they become known to the commander.
This is a simple distinction, but its presence in military field manuals is convincing evidence that
command responsibility for offences under a predecessor commander is assumed in customary
military law. Taken together with the Protocol I distinction (which gives broader temporal
application to the disciplinary responsibility of commanders in the field than of politicians at a
distance) and the Krnojelac court’s articulation of the permanent commander’s extended
responsibility (in contrast to the time-limited responsibility of the temporary or ad hoc
commander), the military manuals build a convincing case for the broad temporal application of
the duty to punish prong of command responsibility doctrine.
(5) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which was adopted by the United
Nations Diplomatic Conference in 1998 and entered into force in 2002, is remarkable for
presenting a narrower temporal application of command responsibility doctrine than any of the
other recent codifications. Article 28 of the Statute holds a military commander responsible for
crimes committed
“as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over …forces, where:
(a) That military commander … either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the
time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such
crimes; and
(b) That military commander … failed to take all necessary and reasonable
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to
submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and
prosecution.105
It is true that “[t]his language is drawn directly from the Geneva Protocol [Protocol I] and
recognizes that command culpability is based on the failure to fulfill and official duty and is not
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an imputation of liability for the acts of subordinates.”106 However, it imposes a less stringent
standard on military commanders than does Protocol I, since it imports only the Article 86
language which Protocol I applies to the responsibility of the High Contracting Parties and
Parties to the conflict; conspicuously missing is the broader temporal application of Article 87,
which extended the duty of commanders to cover situations in which they are aware that people
under their control are “going to commit or have committed” (emphasis supplied) a breach of the
Geneva Conventions or of Protocol I. It is this alteration which caused at least one commentator
to label the Rome Statute’s treatment of command responsibility as “a step backward”107 since,
as discussed below, it seems to undermine or even eliminate the commander’s duty to punish
offenses of which he becomes aware after their commission.
C. Writings of Commentators
Commentators on command responsibility tend to take either a generally military
perspective, a defendant’s perspective, or a victims’/humanitarian perspective. Although the
second of these must be respected as protecting the due process rights of military commanders,
the combination of the first and third make a strong case for broad temporal application of
command responsibility.
(1) Commentators from military backgrounds
General MacArthur’s comment on the Yamashita case stands for an important position of
the military community, which finds command responsibility and the protection of
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noncombatants an essential element of the soldier’s identity, and its failure a threat to
international society.108

Major William H. Parks, Marine Corps International Criminal Law

Instructor and member of the U. S. Court of Military Appeals, concludes his survey of command
responsibility doctrine by remarking that, according to Marine Corps recruiting literature, “Some
men accept responsibility; others seek it.”109 Those who reach positions of military command
have, the slogan implies, sought the responsibility –the “sacred trust,” according to MacArthur—
of protecting the weak and unarmed in times of war. In Parks’ view, “Neither the principles of
command nor the law of war can expect, nor accept, anything less”110 than the full discharge of
this responsibility to prevent, halt, and punish violations of the laws of war. Colonel William G.
Eckhardt, in making “a plea for a workable standard” of command responsibility, which he says
should require that a commander both caused and could have prevented the violation,
nevertheless asserts that if a commander “had received reports of … incidents and did nothing
about them, then he might be criminally responsible [because] [h]is inaction … would amount to
…active encouragement to commit similar acts.111

(2) Defense-oriented Commentators
Eckhardt’s analysis effectively combines concern for the commander’s due process rights
with acknowledgement that failure to punish draws culpability to a commander. Arguments
more focussed on narrowing the application of command responsibility are presented by, for
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example, the dissenting justices in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Yamashita appeal case. Justice
Rutledge in his dissent protested that
It is not in our tradition for anyone to be charged with crime which is defined after
his conduct … has taken place… [or] where the person is not charged or shown
actively to have participated in or knowingly to have failed in taking action to
prevent the wrongs done by others, having the duty and the power to do so.112
And Major Bruce D. Landrum opines that “holding the prosecution to this higher standard of
proof [which has evolved since Yamashita] is appropriate.”113 Those who argue for a “higher
standard” generally have reference to the knowledge element, which (as discussed above) has
varied from the possibly strict-liability approach of Yamashita to the proof of actual knowledge
required in Medina, but has recently settled at the compromise of a “had reason to know”
standard common to the Statutes of the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC. The temporal application
of the duty to punish prong has been less often addressed and, as discussed below, seems less
clearly settled.
(3) Comments from humanitarian law scholars
In the context of multiple international tribunals dealing with atrocities committed in
various conflicts during the late twentieth century, many commentators have expressed concern
that a narrow application of command responsibility doctrine will tend to perpetuate a “culture of
impunity” which allows combatants to consider atrocities a viable option and an effective way to
achieve their goals. With specific regard to the temporal application of the doctrine, Beth Van
Schaack, writing for Advocacynet during the Rome Conference for the establishment of the
International Criminal Court, warned that the ICC Statute as drafted would “significantly
112
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truncate the scope of the doctrine of command responsibility” because “under the current
formulation … no liability attaches where the superior did not know that subordinates were about
to commit or were committing crimes, but did know later that international crimes ‘had been
committed’ and failed to take steps to have them investigated and punished.”114 Van Schaack
here calls attention to the Protocol I language which also appears in the International Criminal
Tribunal Statutes and in military manuals of several nations, but did not make it into the Rome
Statute. A further concern arising from this same omission is that the Rome Statute as written
would not reach the superior who takes control of subordinates after international
crimes had been committed and fails to punish the perpetrators. … This
formulation of the doctrine of command responsibility sends the following
message: once international crimes are committed by subordinates, the superior
can be conveniently “gotten rid of” and no one at the level of command and
control will be held liable for the crimes of the subordinates. This loophole
combined with the current formulation of Article [33], which allows for the
defense of superior orders, creates a lacuna in international criminal responsibility
where it did not exist before.115
Judge David Hunt’s dissenting opinion in the Kubura case also worries over a “gaping
hole in the protection which international humanitarian law seeks to provide” if the scope of
command responsibility doctrine is thus truncated:
Where the prosecution is unable to identify, to find or to apprehend the relevant
subordinates in order to prosecute them (a common event), there can be no
prosecution if the superior has left his command before he knows or has reason to
know of their commission, because he cannot be prosecuted even though the
superior-subordinate relationship existed at the appropriate time; similarly, the
superior who takes over his command, even though he may quickly know or have
reason to know that the crimes have been committed and yet fail to punish, cannot
be prosecuted for that failure according to [the Appeals Chamber’s decision in
Kubura’s case].116
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A similar concern is expressed by Professor Jordan Paust, who provides a parallel, if
somewhat more optimistic, comment on the Rome Statute:
One problem is that Article 28(1)(a) addresses circumstances where subordinates
“were committing or about to commit” crimes, but does not expressly include the
circumstance also addressable under customary international law where a superior
knew or should have known that crimes had already been committed and the
superior fails to take needed corrective action within his or her power. [citing
Protocol I] Perhaps the next paragraph, addressing, for example, failures to
‘repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution” when coupled with customary international law as
an interpretive background [citing the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
and the Rome Statute Art. 21 (1)(b) and (3)] will assure adequate coverage.”117
Such “adequate coverage,” against the interpretive background of customary international law
should, then, include the broad temporal application of command responsibility doctrine whose
potential constriction Van Schaack , Hunt, and Paust have noted with concern.
While comments as specifically focused as these three on the temporal application of
command responsibility doctrine have not been frequently made, they are in keeping with a wide
range of commentaries which emphasize the importance of a broad and persistent reinforcement
of the doctrine. Professor Ilias Bantekas is still more optimistic than Professor Paust, for he
concludes that “Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute, Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute, Article 86(2)
of Geneva Protocol I and Article 28(1)(a) of the ICC Statute firmly establish the existence of a
duty to prevent and a duty to punish the crimes of subordinate persons.”118 Expanding on the
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temporal application of the duty to punish prong, Bantekas vigorously asserts the position argued
by the minority justices in the Kubura appeal119 discussed at the opening of this memorandum:
A superior’s “duty to punish” arises after the commission of an offense. It is
predicated upon offenses by others which have already occurred, not future
offenses. Punishment is, therefore, intended to deter the commission of future
offenses. … The duty to punish does not require a pre-existing relationship to
those who perpetrated the offenses, as this would have been part of the incumbent
superior’s preventive duty at the time the offenses occurred. Thus even persons
who assume command after such offenses have taken place are under a duty to
investigate and punish the offenders. … Tolerating criminal conduct, as evidenced
by the failure to punish, is tantamount to acquiescence.120
Professor Lippman points out that “command culpability is designed to encourage
military commanders and civilian superiors to fulfill their legal duty to control the conduct of
combatants.121 This is important for many reasons. Payam Akhavan concludes that “[b]eyond
retribution and the moral impulse to vindicate humanitarian norms, individual accountability for
massive crimes is an essential part of a preventive strategy and, thus, a realistic foundation for a
lasting peace.”122 One reason why this is true is that “a post conflict culture of justice … makes
moral credibility a valuable political asset for victim groups, rendering vengeance less tempting
and more costly.”123 In the current climate of increased attempts to enforce command
responsibility, “[t]here is at least modest anecdotal evidence to suggest that some individual
actors in the former Yugoslavia have adhered more closely to the requirements of international
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humanitarian law than they would have otherwise, for fear of punishment.”124 This is in contrast
to a 1993 report that “in response to a rebellion by Serbian troops, … Karadzic promised officers
that if they returned they would not be punished for their roles in war crimes.”125 On the
hopeful assumption that such progress is in fact being made, the international legal community
should continue to accumulate precedents of accountability, not truncating but rather giving full
force to customary international law in order to “serve notice on all personnel in command that
… should they choose not to enforce energetically the law of war, they do so at their own
peril.”126

IV

Conclusion

An important point to note in closing is that, as with any other type of legal scenario,
every episode of command culpability may have distinguishing features which courts must
consider. Major Parks sums up some of the complexities:
In order to find a commander responsible, the acts charged must have been
committed by troops under his command. Normally this refers to troops of his
unit or of another unit over which he has both operational and administrative
control; but absent either he may still be responsible if he otherwise had a duty
and the means to control those troops and failed to do so. If he has executive
authority over a specified occupied territory, he is responsible for all illegal acts
occurring within that territory, or at least for controlling or preventing their
occurrence.127
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While the presumption of a commander’s knowledge of and therefore of his responsibility for his
subordinates’ illegal actions may be rebutted by “a showing of absence from the command at the
time of the offense,” still that rebuttal is “temporary in nature, extending only for the period of
the absence,” and “[a]ny inaction upon resumption of command raises a presumption of
acquiescence, knowledge again being presumed.”128 It is logical that if a commander is liable for
failure to punish violations which he discovers have taken place during a time when he was
temporarily away from his command, he should also be liable for failure to punish violations
which he discovers have taken place prior to his assuming command.
The presumption of acquiescence in violations known but not punished fits with the
broad temporal application discussed above. An important element of the most thorough
commentaries on command responsibility, however, is the acknowledgement that specific
conditions of each case should be considered in assigning liability. Major Parks notes that “[i]n
determining whether the commander … should have known … of the occurrence of the offenses
charged, certain subjective criteria may be considered…” on a case-by-case basis. These criteria
include the rank, experience, mobility, and isolation of the commander; the age, experience,
training, and general composition of the forces under his command; the size of staff,
communications abilities, and the complexity and comprehensiveness of duties attached to the
commander’s position; and the general combat situation.129 Sequence of staff changes is a
factual element related to these listed criteria. For example, in the case of Amir Kubura, charges
were made of command responsibility for failure to punish violations which occurred in January
and June of 1993. Kubura became substitute commander of the Corps in question on April 1,
1993, and the Appeals Chamber suggested that he could therefore not be charged with command
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responsibility for violations before that time; but the fact that he was Chief of Staff for the Corps
from January 1, 1993 should argue strongly for his knowledge of the violations and the Corps’
“history of unpunished criminality.”130 Thus, according to the foregoing analysis, Kubura and
other commanders similarly situated should be required to punish their subordinates’ violations
committed under predecessor commanders—or be prosecuted themselves for failing to do so.
It is certainly true that the rights of individuals, both victims and defendants, should be
guarded by the rule of law. Professor Jordan Paust has pointed out that customary international
law, if applied “without extra limitations not found in customary international law,” can be
administered by international tribunals in such a way as “to avoid problems connected with ‘the
principle nullem crimen sine lege’”131 If this is done, Paust’s fear that “[t]he prohibition of
crimes against humanity is in danger of being whittled away by newly restrictive definitions”132
may be averted. Professor Lippman has asserted that “[m]issing from the jurisprudence of
command responsibility is the moral dimension. The legal niceties divert attention from the
question of whether there is an ethical imperative or privilege to intervene to prevent war crimes
… .”133 Clearly there is such an ethical imperative, and it is recognized by many commentators,
both military and legal. As a general principle, that imperative supports a broad temporal
application of command responsibility doctrine.
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